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Abstract
Purpose – To demonstrate that the past of the social sciences contains all the elements of
sociocybernetics and that those elements combined with the logic of modern interdisciplinary
simulation research will meet challenges modern society poses to those sciences.
Design/methodology/approach – A historical analysis, leading to an outline of advanced logic of
social science research, shows the way to modern (computer) simulation research.
Findings – When the theoretical principles of sociocybernetics are put into practice by doing
(empirically based) simulation research, it can handle in a scientifically valid way a number of research
questions modern complex society poses, such as how processes of self-organization in individuals,
groups and institutes can be described and understood; self-organization of autobiographic memory of
individuals can be simulated in a computer; these individual memories are related to collective
memories of generations; these different generations of social researchers can work together and
balance in a creative synergy between the wisdom of the past and surprising hypotheses of the future.
Research limitations/implications – Social sciences researchers have to work with advanced
logic of research such as is propagated in simulation research and by sociocybernetics.
Practical implications – Different generations of sociocyberneticians here to work together in
(empirically based) simulation research to demonstrate the usefulness of sociocybernetical theory and
logic.
Originality/value – Sociocybernetics is not an exotic field but a normal legitimate constituent of the
social sciences.
Keywords Scientific management, Systems theory, Cybernetics, Feedback, Self assessment, Simulation
Paper type Research paper
1. A short history of the social sciences
1.1 From irrationality to rationality and back
In the history of science rationality has always been at the base of scientific attitude.
In our past millennium the sciences were acknowledged as an enterprise that beat
the feudal past of our society (Comte, 1842). Instead of systems of belief in which the
destiny of an individual was in the unintelligible hands of God or rulers, scientific
knowledge would make it possible for an individual to understand nature and society,
and with this knowledge to determine in freedom their own future.
But to let rationality work, the rules of the game of science had to be established.
To surpass feudal systems of belief one needs freedom of argumentation in which
the rational language of science was followed and facts and logic were respected
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(Wiener Kreis, 1929). This was the transparent rational base of the science of Schlick,
Carnap and von Neurath and a starting point of a heroic effort to lay down a solid
ground for rational scientific reasoning. However, a lifetime was too short for these
pioneers to overcome the many obstacles. Carnap, for example, in developing scientific
rationality struggled too much with inductive statistics. As a consequence a new
generation of philosophers of science had to take over the torch of scientific rationality.
One of these philosophers of science was Popper (1959, 1967). Popper clearly
approved the way the “Wiener Kreis” tried to give science a basis in logic and
mathematics, but he thought that Carnap’s attempts to establish a logic of inductive
probability had to be tailored. One should focus more on the rationality of deduction,
than on the tricky logic of induction. Instead of trying to prove the correctness of a
statement with induction (verification), one could better try to prove the incorrectness
of a statement with the much simpler logic of deduction (falsification). Science has to be
as simple as possible.
However, followers of Popper misunderstood his carefully balanced ideas of
induction and deduction, verification and falsification. Too many simplifications found
their way into the practice of social research. Instead of a sophisticated falsificationism,
a naive and dogmatic use of ideas of falsification developed within the scientific
community (Lakatos, 1970). In the social sciences (including economy) scarcely any
other models than simple linear ones were used. The analysis of cause and effect
relations was simplified to a one-way analysis of the linear dependency of the effect on
the cause, expressed as a linear correlation (van Dijkum, 1997).
With such simplifications the logic of the sciences fell into regression. Kuhn (1962)
identified this regression in suggesting that science is not a rational enterprise,
but governed by different paradigms stemming from different world views.
Feyerabend (1975) went one step further with his idea that no logic could be found
in science, with the exception of the creativity of an individual. The analytical onset of
the Vienna Circle to establish a rational logic of science was reversed into an irrational
logic.
1.2 Blocking progress
With this degeneration important contributions to a rational logic of the social sciences
were also blocked. In system theory (von Bertafalany, 1942) it was argued that
sometimes a phenomenon in the world can be viewed as a system. This system has its
own identity by being more than the sum of his parts. Advocates of simple
falsificationism advertised as critical rationalism (Albert, 1977) did not accept this
“holistic” point of view because it could not be analytically grounded and could not be
falsified[1].
Also the next step, from system theory to cybernetics made by Wiener (1948, 1954)
was far beyond the dominating logic in the practice of the social sciences. The same
could be said of the progress Aulin (1990) made by introducing the idea of feedback in
the relation between cause and effect, coined in the concept of recursive causality, and
operationalized in recursive differential equations (van Dijkum, 2001). Also system
dynamics (Forrester, 1968; Meadows et al., 1974; Hanneman, 1988; Richardson and
Pugh, 1981) using recursive differential equations hardly found its way to social
science research.
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1.3 The challenge of sociocybernetics
This situation was one of the reasons why Geyer (1995) posed a challenge to the main
stream of the social sciences. The social sciences do pretend that they have a function
in our society. But our modern society is faced with a large number of complex social
problems and the social sciences seem hardly prepared to handle these problems.
Especially they do not have the knowledge and the attitude to tackle the dynamics of
complex social problems. To analyze, explain and handle complex social problems
such as – alienation, environment pollution, economic problems of underdeveloped
countries, the (self)organization of groups, firms and societies – one needs advanced
concepts from system theory and cybernetics. However, since Geyer and others
(Buckley, 1967; Hornung, 1988, 1995; van Dijkum and van Mens-Verhulst, 2002) posed
the challenge to the social sciences to do more advanced research, with the aid of
systems theory and cybernetics, not much has happened and the challenge seems to be
in vain.
1.4 Back to the past
Is the reason for that failure to be found in the mismatching of the social sciences with
those advanced concepts? To answer this question one has to look at what the social
sciences originally were striving for.
1.4.1 The past of sociology. Let us go back to the history of sociology. For example,
at what was the sociological venture of Comte (1842) aimed at:
. . . sociology consists in the investigation of the laws of action and reaction of the different
parts of the social system – apart, for the occasion, from the fundamental movement which is
always gradually modifying them . . . It studies the balance of mutual relations of elements
within a social whole. There must always be a . . . spontaneous harmony between the whole
and the parts of the social system . . . It is evident that not only must political institutions and
social manners, on the one hand, and manners and ideas on the other, be always mutually
connected; but further that this consolidated whole must always be connected, by its nature,
with the corresponding state of the integral development of humanity . . . (Cours de
Philosophie Positiv, translated and condensed by Martineau H. as The Positive Philosophy,
Vol. 2, New York: Appleton & Co).
Already Comte was writing about social systems. According to him the rational
enterprise of science made it possible to support the integral development of humanity.
Sociology was a kind of social physics, but the complexity of the human interaction
with society was at a different level (from that of the natural sciences) and that was
why sociology was aiming higher. Comte made it quite clear that one of the difficulties
for sociology was to build up an adequate theoretical framework, because “observation
of facts and experimentation were crucial for sociology”, but only when it was guided
by carefully built theories. That was one of the reasons why Parsons (1951), viewing
social situations as social systems, invented a systematic nomenclature to map the
characteristics of those systems. Following the footsteps of Comte and Parsons,
Zetterberg (1973) stated that the social scientist has to work together with researchers
from disciplines such as demography, economics, science of history. Moreover, he
stated that the dynamics of social systems, in particular the way causes influence
effects, has to be expressed in differential equations[2].
1.4.2 The past of psychology. In the nineteenth century, and parallel to social
dynamics, notions of mental dynamics also emerged in psychology. As early as
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1824-1825 the German philosopher and mathematician Herbart introduced the
concepts of mental statics and dynamics. He pointed out that ideas or Vorstellungen
have three dimensions (variables): time, quality and intensity. Quality individualizes
each idea and makes a different from b. Ideas may also vary in intensity or force
(Kraft), which should be understood as a tendency to self-preservation. Each idea
makes an effort to conserve itself as it enters into relation with others: the ideas are
active, especially when there is opposition among them. Herbart thought of this
tendency as the fundamental principle of mental dynamics, taking into account that
every movement of the ideas is confined between two fixed points: their state of
complete inhibition and their state of complete liberty (Boring, 1950, pp. 250-60).
With Herbart’s psychology as background, in particular his concept of the limen or
threshold that an idea seems to jump in passing from a state of complete inhibition to a
state of real idea, the German psychophysicist Fechner published in 1860 his book
Elemente der Psychophysik (Elements of Psychophysics), in which Weber’s principle
plays a central role. By comparing objects and observing the distinction between them,
we perceive not the difference between objects, but the ratio of this difference to the
magnitude of the objects compared. This principle was later called by Fechner “a law”,
and has become known since then as Weber-Fechner’s law. It was expressed in
mathematical terms, in the formula dS/S ¼ C, in which S is the stimulus, d is the just
noticeable difference (limen), and C is the constant (Misiak and Sexton, 1966). It was in
this way that differential calculus finally entered psychology and psychophysics and
that the logarithm’s graphs showed the mathematical solution of those differential
equations[3].
2. An unifying model for the social sciences
Both in sociology and psychology the onsets to the precursors of the advanced
concepts of system theory and cybernetics can be found in the past. There is no reason
why the social sciences should not use those concepts, unless that it pays for
researchers to stay with outdated ideas of simple falsificationism. But in that case the
social sciences are only belief systems (or ideologies) of an ill functioning elite.
To continue with real science, or to let survive the social sciences in our modern
complex world, one better explores the way the original onsets to the advanced
concepts of system theory and cybernetics can be applied. Let us start with the idea of
feedback.
2.1 An elementary model of feedback
Insight into behavior gives the possibility to modify behavior. How that happens is
explained by Wiener, who, not by coincidence is also worrying about the question of
how the behavior of animal and man could be controlled in a rational way. He
introduced the idea that there is a feedback between behavior, an intended goal of
behavior, an observed effect, the insight gained from the comparison between the
observed effect and the goal, and again the behavior itself. It is a logic which
psychologists can perhaps more easily adapt than sociologists, because it refers to the
logical kernel of their discipline, which is to describe and explain behavior. But a
sociologist who is keen at the historical roots of his discipline, and not trapped in the
ill developed specialization of the social sciences in a multitude of subdisciplines, will
acknowledge the importance of the logic of feedback (Figure 1).
K
35,3/4
388
Let us then, as social scientists, as a consequence use a feedback model for the
systematic interaction between behavior, effect, goal, and insight, a model that is not
only useful for psychology and sociology but also for other disciplines of the social
sciences that are interested in human beings, who interact with themselves, with other
human beings, or with nature- and men made environment.
2.2 Elementary mathematics
In this elementary model behavior leads to an effect (in or outside a human being),
comparing that with the goal of the behavior leads to insight, and insight in its turn
gives rise to (a change of) behavior producing a different effect. More exactly, at a time
t, effect ¼ function (behavior); at time t þ Dt, insight ¼ anotherfunction (effect of
behavior, goal of behavior); and at a time t þ 2Dt, behavior ¼ againanotherfunction
(insight).
Insight and effect, as can be noticed, are intermediary variables. As a consequence
they are to be substituted by behavior and goal. In this way one comes to a differential
equation, in which the temporal change of behavior is related to a goal and the
temporal change of insight; and the temporal change of insight is related to temporal
change of behavior (in a first approximation supposing that the goal is not changed):
DBehavior
DTime
¼ functionðBehavior; GoalÞ
Simple linear feedback models are easily constructed and in the history of science
aimed at phenomena such as exponential growth of capital and populations. It is
expressed in a linear difference (or differential) equation such as:
Dpopulation
Dtime
¼ ðbirthrate2 deathrateÞ * population:
In a more recent history of the social sciences more sophisticated models have been
developed, for example, in economy (Jevons, 1988), or concerning problems war and
peace (Richardson, 1988).
Modern software such as STELLA, POWERSIM, MADONNA and MATLAB make
it easy for social scientists to develop system dynamics models, so that a variety of
phenomena can be investigated. The theory, which has to be modeled, needs only to
Figure 1.
A model of behavior
feedback
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articulate some variables, which can be, quantified in a meaningful way, and has to
make explicit linear feedback loops.
Promising are non-linear feedback models, especially because most of social
systems are driven by non-linear feedback. Verhulst (1838) introduced in the past
century a well-known model that simply supposes that the growth of population is
limited by the scarcity of means for support. To realize this he launched, next to the
normal rate of growth of population (birthrate 2 deathrate), a multiplier inversely
(linear) related to the magnitude of the population. The more the population grows, the
more a brake is set to the growth. That is expressed in a recursive difference equation:
Dp
Dt
¼ constant * p * ð12 pÞ:
These equations are used in disciplines such as demography, biology, and economy to
study fascinating time dependant patterns of development.
For authors like Prigogine and Nicolis (1977) and Haken (1982) recursive equations
were the starting point for the investigation of patterns of chaos and order in nature
and in living systems. They developed models in which, out of chaos, order evolved.
These recursive models appear to be adequate metaphors to study processes of
self-organization in the social sciences (van Dijkum, 1997).
3. Simulation as a modern instrument of research
3.1 Simulation as a starting point
For social scientists dynamic systems theory (with simulation models built by
user-friendly software)[4] is an adequate starting point for research into the dynamics
of social systems. Although a number of adequate starting points for research into
feedbackmodels can be found in the social sciences, empirical research as a follow-up
and validation of these models is rare. The reason for this could be that most of the
empirical research of the social sciences is guided by the paradigm of (linear)
uni-directional causality. As a consequence there is a gap between dynamic theories
and static methods of empirical research and analyses of data. The use of advanced,
sometimes called non-linear multivariate, statistics does not really help. Also this does
not take into account the principle of recursive causality and the mathematics of
recursive linear and non-linear differential equations.
However, some pioneering work is also done. Van der Zouwen (1997) describes
some of that research in the field of education (Norle`n, 1975), and two studies about
emigration (Diamantides, 1994; Jacobsen and Bronson, 1995). Inspired by those studies
van Dijkum et al. (2001) did a simulation study on the dynamics of educational
expansion. A rather simple dynamic model could describe and explain a dataset
covering surveys of achieved education in the Netherlands over a period of more than
70 years. More empirical studies can also be found in the field of aids prevention
(Ahlemeyer, 1997), analysis of events of war and peace (Byron, 1997), and concerning
the psychology of self-fulfilling prophecies (Henshel, 1997). A rather interesting
sociological study into the logic of spatio-temporal systems has been done by
Leydesdorff (2000). He tries to model the self-organization of technological change.
He models the way new technologies appear, compete with each other, lock in,
dominate for a period of time the marketplace, and after another period of time, by a
process of self-organization, are surpassed by new technologies. The study shows how
spatio-temporal feedback systems can be operationalized and studied in an empirical
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way with the help of computer simulation of cellular automata. In the domain of
psychology (van Mens-Verhulst et al., 2003; van Dijkum et al., 2002) demonstrated that
a dynamic simulation model was very useful to understand the self-organizing
behavior of patients with complaints of fatigue.
All this work showed that the challenge of sociocybernetics can be taken. Complex
behavior of individuals, groups or societies can be scientifically examined by
operationalizing the advanced principles of systems theory and cybernetics in
computer simulation studies. Self-organizing processes are then fascinating objects of
modern scientific study.
3.2 An example worked out in detail
In the research program Life-course Dynamics (Schroots, 2003a), the self-organization
of behavior is studied over the course of life at different levels of theorizing on the basis
of a longitudinal data set, generated by means of the lifeline interview method (LIM).
Part of this program relates to the study of autobiographical memory, which is
commonly examined by asking individuals to freely recall events from their own lives
and plot the events according to age at encoding. For young adults the distribution of
past events (PEs) follows a power function, similar to the classic forgetting or retention
curve (Section 1.4.2). For middle-aged and older adults, however, the retention curve
turns unexpectedly into an event distribution with a “bump”, i.e. a concentration of
memories between 10 and 30 years of age. As will be described below, the mysterious
problem of the autobiographical memory bump has been solved by means of computer
simulation (Schroots and van Dijkum, 2004).
From a static perspective, autobiographical memory consists of two modules, a
prospective and a retrospective memory module. Prospective memory includes all
future events (FE) or expectations of the individual; retrospective memory, on the other
hand, stores all PEs or memories. Autobiographical memory, however, is not a static
but a dynamic system, subject to continuous changes. From a dynamical perspective,
then, autobiographical memory consists of a flow of events which undergo a change of
state over the course of time, from FE (expectation) to PE (memory).
A significant outcome of research with the LIM is the finding that the overall number
of memories and expectations does not differ by age. Schroots and Assink (1998)
expressed the relative capacity of autobiographical memory in the so-called “Principle of
the Constant Life Perspective”, i.e. the sum of past and future autobiographical events is
constant across the lifespan. This principle refers basically to the changing ratio of past
(or future) events and the sum of PE and FE over the course of life during which young
adults, in comparison with middle-aged and older adults, nourish relatively more
expectations (FEs) than memories (PEs), and conversely, older adults nourish more
memories than expectations, while the sum of their memories and expectations is
constant over the lifespan. In a later study Schroots et al. (2004) suggested that the
changing ratio with age follows a power curve in which there is a limit to growth or
decline, i.e. the S-shaped, logistic growth or decline curve. Summarizing, a dynamic
(proto)theory of autobiographical memory has been developed and the question is how
to construct a simulation model on the basis of this theory.
The first step in constructing a dynamic model includes the identification of variables
and their connections, as specified in the above prototheory of autobiographical
memory. From these variables and their dynamic relations, a causal diagram can be
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constructed which expresses graphically how causes are related to effects and vice
versa. The result of this mapping is shown in Figure 2.
The Figure 2 describes that there is a negative relationship between FE and PEs,
which for their part have positive relations withE(events) as the outcome variable of the
dynamic flow of FE and PE, which in turn is maintained by the negative feedback loop of
E and PE. Mathematically, the flow (E) from FE to PE, supposing that the sum of FE and
PE is constant, and speeded up or slowed down by a parameter (Schroots et al., 2004), can
be expressed in a differential equation[5], as articulated, for instance, in population
dynamics for processes of limited growth (Zill and Cullen, 1997).
dE
dt
¼ parameter *E * ðConstant2 EÞ
Constant
Computer simulation (STELLA, 2000) of this simple model over a period of 100 years
shows that the relative distributions of PE and FE events follow two crossing patterns of
a limited growth and decline curve, respectively , and produce a small, bell-shaped
distribution of E at the beginning of the life course, which explains in principle – as we
will see the mysterious autobiographical memory bump (Figure 3).
Simulation of a more complex model the so-called Janus model, over a period of 100
years, shows for three sets of parameters:
(1) a distinct unimodal distribution of events around the age of 20 years;
(2) a weak bimodal distribution around age 25 and 35; and
(3) a strong bimodal distribution around the ages of 30 and 60 years (Figure 4, solid
line).
The three simulated event distributions (solid line) of the Janus model, called after the
Roman god with two faces – one face looking into the future and one into the past –
have been interpreted as follows:
(1) The retention and encoding curves of young adults show complete overlap,
there is only one peak in the curve;
(2) As people reach middle age, the retention and encoding curves seem to
dissociate, a small bump emerges slowly from the original bump;
(3) When people grow older, the dissociation of retention and encoding comes to an
end in the form of two peaks, one for encoding, i.e. the sought-after
autobiographical memory bump, and one for retention of PE and FE.
Figure 2.
Causal diagram of a
dynamic model
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Finally, the crucial question arises as to the fit between the Janus model and the LIM
data set. To answer this question an advanced simulation program was used (Macey
et al., 2000) that finds those parameter values in the Janus model that minimize the
deviation between the model’s output and the LIM data set (Figure 4).
In concluding this detailed example, we can state that the dynamic Janus model
reproduces the emerging unimodal and bimodal patterns of events across the lifespan
quite satisfactorily, i.e. the model’s maxima are a close fit to the modus of the observed
peaks and bumps in the LIM data set.
4. Collective memory and the conflict of generations in science
4.1 A socio-psychological view
Apart from the epistemological question how knowledge can be built up in science
according to rational principles – a subject which is dealt with in the sociology of
knowledge (Swidler and Arditi, 1994, but see also our earlier discussion from a
systems-theoretical perspective) – the interesting problem can be posed how
individual researchers develop their scientific knowledge. The basic question is what
kind of information and knowledge researchers remember, forget and use in practice,
in particular, what kind of theoretical framework guides their research? Starting from
the concept of autobiographical memory, two closely related concepts should be
introduced, i.e. “collective memory” and “generations”.
The term “collective memory” has been advanced by Halbwachs in 1950 to describe
memories of a shared past that are retained by members of a group, large or small, that
experienced it (Schuman and Scott, 1989). The concept is both suggestive and difficult
to specify clearly, but Pennebaker et al. (1997, p. 4) re-introduced and circumscribed the
concept as follows:
Figure 3.
Basic model of the
distribution of events
(percents)
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Figure 4.
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The creation and maintenance of a collective or historical memory is a dynamic social and
psychological process. It involves the ongoing talking and thinking about the event by the
affected members of the society or culture. This interaction process is critical to the
organization and assimilation of the event in the form of a collective narrative.
In explanation of collective memories Pennebaker and colleagues refer to the work of
Mannheim (1968), who already in 1928 observed that each generation receives a
distinctive imprint from the social and political events of its youth.
Research dealing with autobiographical memories suggests that certain events have
more impact for people at certain ages than others. In fact, personal events that occur
between ages 10 and 30 – the so-called (autobiographical memory) bump period – are
some of the most long lasting and significant events of a person’s life (Rubin, 1986). In
2005 the world-view of a 60-year old scientist or scholar was formed in the historical
period between 1955 and 1975. It is the task of cultural historians and sociologists to
characterize that period, but one may safely say that the majority of today’s 60-year old
social scientists not only experienced or witnessed the student revolution at the end of
the sixties while studying, but also saturated their minds with the research
methodology and paradigms of the sixties. In the words of Schroots (2003b, p. 447):
In the bump period of their life people start dating, have their first relationships, are educated,
look for their first job, feel physically strongest, become politically aware, go the best movies
of their life, read the most memorable books, listen to their most loved music, and experience
their most intensive learning. In brief, the bump period is the cognitive-affective frame of
reference from which middle-aged and older people view life in general, and relations, work,
health and education in particular.
The concept of generation often denotes successive groups in time. Generations occur
within lineages or descent lines – but not necessarily so. The individual and his/her
parents and children comprise three distinct (biological) generations. Similarly, the
scientist and his/her mentor and students could be conceived as three generations in
science. Both from a biological and historical perspective the temporal distance
between two generations will generally represent a time frame between 20 and 30 years
(Pennebaker and Banasik, 1997). With the formula for the bump period in mind, it is
conceivable that science generations are also 20-30 years apart. In other words, at one
point in time one could distinguish approximately two generations of scientists who
are active in their field, either as a student or junior scientist at the start of his/her
career, or as a professor or senior scientist. For the sake of simplicity they are called the
young and old generation. The question arises what this cultural and biological
distinction between young and old generations in the social sciences means for the
production of scientific knowledge.
In principle there are two perspectives, a junior and a senior perspective, rooted in the
lifespan patterns of mental abilities with both age-positive and age-negative (or ageist)
components (Nelson, 2002). To start with the lifespan patterns, general intelligence can
be divided into two types of mental abilities, i.e. “fluid” or spatial-analytical abilities,
which refer to basic processes of abstract reasoning and information processing, and
“crystallized” abilities, which refer to cultural knowledge and experience. The pattern of
mental abilities is that of differential decline over the lifespan with a peak for fluid
abilities (abstract reasoning) in the bump period between the tenth and thirtieth year,
while the crystallized abilities of cultural knowledge and learning experiences continue
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to increase over time. From the perspective of mental abilities there is no generational
equity, i.e. young scientists are inquisitive, flexible, creative and at the peak of their fluid
abilities, while older scientists hold on to their formal position and the accumulated
knowledge from the bump period of their lives. On the other hand, older scientists have
much to offer in terms of experience, knowledge, mentorship and even wisdom for the
benefit of the student’s education and career. The potential conflict between the young
and older generations of social scientists lies, therefore, in the impotence of both parties
to recognize the mutual possibilities for amassing scientific knowledge, i.e. continuity
and tradition from the side of older scientists and discontinuity and paradigm changes
from the side of younger generations. A possible solution of this conflict needs by
definition a dynamic approach, as science generations are not static, but dynamic
entities which change over time, not only according to calendar age, but also to their
residual lifespan (Principle of the Constant Life Perspective).
We suggest that the social sciences solve the conflict of generations, intrinsic to the
psychological and social processes of scientific knowledge accumulation, by creating a
permanent space – both in terms of finances and media – for experiments in research
methodology, content and design under the circulating leadership of both young and
older scientists.
4.2 Science as a modern powerplay
We live in a society with social networks that because of globalization and other strong
social forces (modernization, for example) become more and more entangled. Social
problems that are inevitable arise, – for example, between minority groups; or because
of social inequality between different classes; or as a result of conflicts in interest
between different countries and cultures; or because of egoistic mismanagement of
nature by the established elite – are complicated and hard to understand by the social
sciences. It is just because of that situation that sociocyberneticians, and not only them,
make a plea for a more adequate logic of science in which the concept of complexity plays
an important role. In defining that concept the principle of recursive causality and the
related cybernetic frame work of feedback logic is crucial. Complexity in a mathematical
view has to do with non-linear differential equations, and those equations become
evident when one wants to model, describe and understand non-linear feedback in social
systems that always show up in the real world (van Dijkum, 1997). It is an insight that
freshmen in the social sciences can easily understand and handle, using the mentioned
modern software. So far young scientist, inspired by the will of the grand old men of
sciences to understand social problems, can fluidly enter the domain of sociocybernetics
and realize some of the ambitions of those distinguished scientist.
However, there is an obstacle between the wisdom of the past of the social sciences
and the use of this knowledge in the modern social sciences, that is the powerful elites
that dominate the established social sciences. It is described by sociologists, it seems
unavoidable in our society: there are always groups that try to dominate, going so far
that they come into conflict with (goal) rationality and even their own human interest
(Habermas, 1968, 1973). Despite this insight also in the social sciences elites,
imprisoned in the narrow logical framework of simple falsificationism, play their
bureaucratic games: with peer reviewed journals, by excluding unfamiliar paradigms
from financial support, and alas above all by disciplining (and boring) freshmen into
their own narrow minded ideological train of thoughts.
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5. The sociocybernetic project: recovering the past and heading for the
future
Thus are the social sciences that sociocyberneticians have to live with. But be
optimistic: as is learned by experimenting with non-linear models of social learning
processes (Scott, 2002; Campbell et al., 2003) the domination is not 100 percent, there
are always niches left. Those can be used to make the (scientific) play between
knowledge acquiring generations a more fair play, and to overcome the alienation
young enthusiastic researchers experience when they enter the practice of social
science research. It is, as is learned by the “science of complexity”, a process of
self-organization and self-regulation. A process society has to learn to handle (and
survive) its severe social problems, also in the domain of education and science.
An essential obstacle is the powerplay of established elites. Realizing that it is a
play in which all kinds of tricks are used, sociocyberneticians can be more clever than
their opponents and deconstruct old inadequate rules, reconstruct old adequate rules,
and construct new constructive rules for the scientific game.
Deconstruction of established rules and knowledge is a practice that regularly shows
up in the history of the social sciences. One can refer to the opposition against
quantitative oriented sociology by members of the Chicago School (Blumer, Glaser and
Strauss), the opposition of action researchers against research without societal relevance
(Lewin, Clark, Holzkamp, Berger), the deconstruction activity of marxist oriented French
social scientists (Foucault, DeLeuze, Derrida, Lacan, Irrigaray), and so on. Most
remarkable in those deconstruction practices were the number of students that were
inspired and activated. But also remarkable is that, after all, little is left of that spirit,
according to critics, because the opponents became themselves an established elite.
Anyway, those successes in deconstruction show that it is possible to destabilize the
dominant paradigm. It opens also the possibility to be a constructivist in the game of
science in which destabilizing and stabilizing scientific objects (theories, models,
measurement instruments, empirical facts) seems to be the real issue (de Zeeuw, 1998).
The ISA research committee RC51 certainly has members and ideas that were
influenced by those oppositions, but it is historically more correct to locate the start of
sociocybernetical deconstruction activity by the way Luhmann used systems theory
(and later on the theory of autopoiesis) to criticize and confuse established sociology
(including the marxist opposition)[6]. After some confusion in the sociocybernetic
society this deconstruction activity turned out well, and was the starting point for some
inspiring (re)construction activity (Ahlemeyer, 1997; Hornung, 1995; in this issue:
Buchinger). In this way innovative knowledge generating activities were started, and
established in articles, books and newsletters.
With this activity of publishing, another obstacle in the powerplay of established
social science can be tackled, that is the vicious circle of domination of conventional
journals. At first deviant journals such as the Journal of Sociocybernetics will not get
much recognition. According to the (social) science citation index (an instrument of
control of the dominant elite) the reward (or better said, the punishment for wasting
time) is very low. However, as is demonstrated by two innovative journals, i.e. the
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation (JASSS) and Non linear Dynamics,
Psychology, and Life Sciences (NDPLS), the efforts are not in vain. After a period of time
one can enter “the hall of fame of the social science citation index” (JASSS), and even
score a higher impact factor than most of the already established journals (NDPLS).
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Authors who want to participate in this power citation play are wise to publish in
established journals, as well as in innovative journals. But what is sure, only
inspiration and the enthusiastic support of sociocybernetic fellow travelers can
motivate social researchers to do so.
Another strong device for deconstruction and (re)construction is to use the
imagination of Art and Literature, as is demonstrated by several members of RC51
(Misheva, 2002; Wood, 2002). The scientific status of social sciences can be discussed.
Do we deal with already well developed disciplines, or with domains that still have to
ripe (Bo¨hm et al., 1978)? In this situation artistic imagination can be of a stronger
scientific value than bureaucratic knowledge.
Anyway, the powerplay of established social sciences can be (re)constructed with
sociological, psychological and artistic imagination in an interplay between generations
that are inspired by the delights of sociocybernetic ideas. However, one lesson is still to
learned, that is to be able to demarcate between science and common knowledge and above
all, between science and ideological reasoning. Essential for this is falsification and
verification of scientific knowledge. To prevent the traps and regression of simple
falsificationism, modern social scientists have to train themselves in logic, systems theory,
and cybernetics. Interdisciplinary cooperation is thereby a must and the universal
language of mathematics has to be mastered. One has learned arithmetic in primary school
and in secondary school to be capable in algebra and geometry. In modern secondary
schools the differential calculus is in the program of education. In the near future the
language of non-linear differential equations has to be understood by each scientist to be
able to describe and explain nature, human beings and society. Only in this way can
scientific imagination support our complex society to solve severe social problems. With
simulations – i.e. making transparent all the bold thoughts, descriptions and explanations
of evolving complex social systems – one can keep the right track (with falsifying and
verifying) of scientific intuition guided by useful and tested knowledge.
Notes
1. They did not accept that, for example, the meta-theory of Go¨del a.o. became a solid element
of advanced logic and mathematics (Kleene, 1971).
2. Earlier, Comte introduced in his monumental work on the development of all sciences (in ten
volumes) in the framework of positive philosophy, the delights of the differential calculus.
3. In this context also the experimental work of the German psychologist Ebbinghaus should be
mentioned, who published in 1885 his epoch-making book on the higher mental processes of
memory (Ueber das Geda¨chtnis). Based among others on the new experimental methodology,
Ebbinghaus adapted Fechner’s psychophysical methods to the problem of the measurement
of human memory and was the first to publish the experimental results of measuring
forgetting as a function of time, represented in the famous “forgetting curve” (Boring, 1950).
4. There are of course more methods of simulation that are relevant for the social sciences, for
example, such as are incorporated in expert systems.
5. It should be noted that the differential equation is similar to the equation as developed by
Herbart (footnote in Section 1.4.2).
6. Also this powerplay seems to be effective, considering the number of students that tried to
read all the books and articles Luhmann published. But also here the problem showed up
that the opposition gradually established their own powerplay and started to exclude
oppononents by declaring that they did not read Luhmann well.
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